Noir0x63 / Security research

Eduardo
Camarillo

Application security researcher

I work in AppSec, investigating failures in authorization, business logic and applied cryptography through source review, adversarial modeling and targeted verification.

Research ↓

01 / AppSec

Application-security assessments.

Application-security work is grouped here: public disclosures and authorized assessments, each tied to a reviewed system, evidence trail and remediation state.

Security issues in a Tor-based messenger

Cwtch credited my reports in its 1.17.2 security release. The fixes cover contact permissions and denial-of-service paths in several experimental features.

Relay policy and claim-page exposure

The project names me for reporting an IPv4-mapped IPv6 policy bypass and a claim page exposed on the health listener. Both were addressed in v0.5.3.

Independent client security assessment

A source review of the public web client, shared cryptography package and Tauri shell. The project acknowledges the review and records its own remediation decisions.

GitHub OAuth callback trust boundary

The public advisory records the vulnerability and the reporter credit; the credit is stored in the advisory metadata and may not render on the public page. It describes an unauthenticated server-side request flaw in the GitHub integration callback, followed by a corrective pull request and regression tests.

Binding payments to the right party

Reviewed settlement validation, merchant payment destinations and custody-key handling. Findings are linked to public advisories.

Authorization and module loading

Combined source review with isolated HTTP verification of RLS policies, server-side requests and the daemon's module boundary.

Who can join a conversation?

Reviewed participant authorization, Supabase row-level security and the encrypted-chat architecture. The selected findings include a policy that allowed an authenticated user to add themselves to another conversation, and a user-table read policy that exposed data beyond its intended boundary.

Rendered content and paid API limits

Source review and targeted verification found feed content reaching public pages without adequate escaping, allowing stored script execution, and proxy endpoints without sufficient limits on paid upstream API use.

Billing, reset and desktop boundaries

An independent source review identified plan-assignment RPCs without intended authorization checks, a password-reset flow insufficiently bound to reset context, and desktop distribution issues. Dynamic verification was outside the completed scope; the client remains anonymized.

AmEx phishing operation — delivery chain and response

Defensive reconstruction of an American Express phishing campaign: delivery, kit collection, infrastructure layers, evidence limits and response actions.

ScreenConnect phishing delivery — disclosure record

Research note on an IFFOC-linked ScreenConnect access attempt, with the observed chain, infrastructure and detection guidance.

02 / Further work

Research records.

AppSec assessments

Source review and verification of authorization, business logic, and applied cryptography within an agreed scope. Deliverables include evidence, impact, remediation discussion, and retesting of agreed fixes. Scope, version, access, exclusions, and timeline are documented before work begins.

Assessment details →

03 / Contact

Contact.

For authorized security assessments, research collaboration and responsible disclosure.

[email protected]